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Legitimacy in financial markets: 
Credit Default Swaps in the current crisis 
 
Abstract 
The current financial crisis appears to be a moment of epochal change, an archetypal 
‘legitimation crisis’. The paper examines the impact of this collapse on one particular 
section of the financial markets – that concerned with Credit Default Swaps (CDSs). The 
paper shows how and why the markets for these products expanded and why they were 
integral to the financial crash. The consequence of the crash was a huge loss of 
legitimacy for these markets. The paper examines the processes whereby this legitimacy 
is being reconstructed. In particular it distinguishes between the reestablishment of 
pragmatic legitimacy which is the primary concern of the market participants and the 
reestablishment of broader political legitimacy which concerns governments and 
regulators. It argues that these two forms of re-establishing legitimacy work in different 
ways and proceed at different rates. It explores the tensions to which this leads in terms 
of reconstructing the financial system.  
Keywords: financial markets, power, regulation 





The current financial crisis appears to be a moment of epochal change. The G20 meeting 
in London reported that ‘we face the greatest challenge to the world economy in modern 
times…major failures in the financial sector and in financial regulation and supervision 
were fundamental causes of the crisis. Confidence will not be restored until we rebuild 
trust in our financial system’ (G20, 2009). Gillian Tett, of the Financial Times’ wrote on 
March 10, 2009 that ‘the pillars of faith on which this new financial capitalism were built 
have all but collapsed. That has left everyone from finance minister or central banker to 
small investor or pension holder bereft of intellectual compass, dazed and confused’ (Tett 
2009, March 10, p.9). From an institutionalist perspective, what we are seeing is a case 
where established practices and processes have been undermined. Following Fligstein 
(2001), we can see the current period as a phase in the ‘politics of the creation of market 
institutions’ where private and public actors, national and international in their range and 
scope, are engaging in power struggles to shape the future. This crisis provides social 
scientists with an excellent opportunity to examine the politics of markets in situ as they 
are developing and in this way to clarify the sorts of concepts and frameworks which 
should be applied in an understanding of this process. 
I address this task through focusing in detail on one particular part of the financial market 
that concerned with credit default swaps (CDS). This part of the market is interesting not 
just because of the fact that it was measured in terms of a notional value of $57 trillion by 
the end of 2007 (Bank for International Settlements, 2009b, p. 7) but for three other 
reasons. Firstly, this market, as it came into existence in the late 1990s, embodies the idea 
of a financial market that is ‘free and efficient’, predominantly shaped by private actors 
rather than states and public regulators (Morgan, 2008). Secondly, this constitutes what 
Quack refers to as a ‘transnational market’ in the sense of involving ‘regularised 
relationships of competition over exchange opportunities which interconnect a growing 
number of economic actors from multiple political jurisdictions across the world’ (Quack, 
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forthcoming, p.9). Thirdly, for reasons described later in the paper, CDS products have 
been integrally involved in the financial crisis itself. 
The paper consists of the following parts. The first part presents the theoretical framing 
for the analysis in terms of the politics of market creation, crisis and re-creation. I explore 
the significance of legitimacy claims in developing and sustaining markets, the nature of 
the actors who make those claims and the different audiences which they address. I 
distinguish in particular the way in which market participants construct and understand 
the nature of and the audiences for legitimacy claims from the way in which politicians 
and regulators understand the same processes. The second section describes the nature of 
the financial market and the politics of regulation from the 1990s to the onset of the 
financial crash in 2008. The third section looks at the same period from a market 
participant perspective focusing in particular on the over-the counter (OTC) market for 
CDS, how it developed and with what effect. The fourth section describes the debates 
emerging around reconstruction of the market in the light of the crisis and how actors are 
formulating, articulating and embedding their interests in the emergent new structure. 
The conclusion of the paper draws out the general lessons of this study for an 
understanding of the current financial crisis and for further analyses of processes of 
transnational market creation and market governance 
In methodological terms, the paper relies on publicly available sources to reconstruct the 
details of these markets and the evolving debates on how to re-regulate in the light of the 
financial crisis. These sources range from the press releases and publications of 
companies and industry associations, through to the reports and statistics on aspects of 
financial markets which are produced by central banks, financial regulators, national 
treasuries, legislators and international regulators. This can be supplemented by the study 
of the financial press, websites and blogs as well as insider and journalistic accounts of 
these processes. This variety of sources requires careful and critical sifting and sorting 
particularly in a context such as that under study where all actors have an interest in 
legitimating and rationalizing their own role as part of the ongoing debate about how to 
rebuild the financial system and its regulatory framework. What follows is based upon 
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such a process of sifting and sorting in an effort to make sense of one aspect of a complex 
set of circumstances. Furthermore, it should be noted that these circumstances are still 
evolving at the time of writing (September 2009) and therefore conclusions have to be 
considered as tentative and time-bound, an inevitability where social science seeks to 
engage with contemporary events  
The politics of market creation 
Fligstein argues that governments together with various social actors produce ‘general 
institutional arrangements (both laws and informal rules) around property rights, 
governance structures and rules of exchange for all markets in capitalist societies’ 
(Fligstein, 2001, p. 27; see also the discussions of the social embeddedness of the market 
in  Krippner et al., 2004). Neo-institutionalism contributes to a further refinement of this 
argument in its focus on legitimacy. In the classic formulation of Scott, there are the three 
dimensions to legitimacy which reflect three pillars of institutions – the cognitive, the 
normative and the regulative (Scott, 2008). As these take shape, they exert a powerful 
influence over organizations and social actors to conform (Deephouse and Suchman, 
2008). Therefore, in examining how markets are created and re-created, we are looking at 
the cognitive basis for markets (the technical knowledge and understanding which makes 
them work), the normative basis (the underlying beliefs of market actors about the best 
way in which the market should work) and the regulative framework (how the rules for 
markets are developed and shaped).  
These arguments have been generally developed in contexts where legitimacy issues are 
confined within limited, usually national, boundaries. As Quack points out, many markets 
are transnational in scope and therefore ‘likely to be populated by actors with 
heterogeneous cultural and institutional orientations’ (Quack, forthcoming, p.9). Black 
has also emphasized the significance of polycentric regulatory regimes (Black, 2008). 
She argues that as the rule-making process becomes more transnational, it becomes 
subject to multiple regimes of accountability, creating a polycentric system where 
multiple agencies and actors (public and private; national and international) are 
competing for legitimacy. She states that ‘faced with incompatible legitimacy claims, 
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organizations face a legitimacy dilemma: what they need to do to be accepted in one part 
of their environment, within and outside the regulatory regime, is contrary to how they 
need to respond to another’ (Black, 2008, p. 153). 
However, it becomes clear at times of crisis in markets that there are two levels of 
legitimacy that need to be distinguished: the political and the pragmatic. The first level 
occurs when there is a broad social consensus that something has gone wrong and 
government and/or intergovernmental institutions should intervene. Frequently, this has 
to do with so-called negative externalities or market failures which have been generated 
by private actors leaving to the public the costs of dealing with these failures. This 
invariably spills over into issues of normative commitment as such crises inevitably have 
elements of moral panic and scapegoating about them and discourse becomes moralized, 
a question of good and evil. Similarly the cognitive basis of the institutions may also be 
challenged as actors rethink their assumptions. In terms of this political dimension, the 
politicians and regulators are addressing their claims primarily to national electorates. A 
market crisis inevitably puts governments under strain; their claim to be exercising 
authoritative control over markets through appropriate regulatory mechanisms is 
undermined. Their efforts to restore legitimacy involve claiming to the public that the 
conditions which led to crisis can be controlled and regulated. However, where market 
crises are transnational in nature, governments and regulators have to engage in complex 
negotiations and improved cooperation to deal with the polycentric range of audiences.  
The politics of institutional change and repair which is invariably time consuming and 
complex even when conditions may seem propitious (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003; 
Pierson, 2004; Streeck and Thelen, 2005) reaches new levels of complexity. Interests, 
discourses, practices are divergent, particularly in contexts of international markets and 
pulling them together is slow, requiring compromises and adjustments even in the most 
successful of such reconstructions.  
However, if we focus solely on this level, we miss an equally important set of responses 
to the crisis. This set of responses occurs amongst the market participants themselves, for 
whom a resolution to the crisis or a repair to the institutions is an urgent practical issue.  
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Following Suchman (1995), we can approach them from the notion of ‘pragmatic’ 
legitimacy – a rather fragile form of legitimacy that rests predominantly on the self-
interested calculations of corporate actors about the expectations of their peers. Pragmatic 
legitimacy is also linked to the idea of ‘output legitimacy’ in the sense that it requires that 
the system continues to produce rewards for the participants. The institutional stability 
that emerges also sends a message/signal to wider audiences in society and government 
that what is occurring is acceptable and legitimate, a signal which again is stronger where 
the output of the processes appears beneficial. A crisis at the level of pragmatic 
legitimacy occurs when social practices which previously worked defining roles, 
processes and expectations within a certain sphere appear to have temporarily collapsed 
and positive are no longer being generated. In this context, the question arises as to how 
the market participants put the system back together. The pragmatic legitimacy crisis 
deepens as output legitimacy declines.  
For market actors, time is of the essence since if the market collapses their investment in 
it is lost. The value of firms and of the skills of individuals declines. These actors have an 
incentive to make quick repairs if they possibly can, whatever is happening at the 
political level where negotiations are likely to be slow and difficult. They will 
undoubtedly have an eye on the broader domain of political legitimacy but the urgency of 
their task means that they will aim to make their own decisions on repair, inevitably 
setting a marker for politicians and regulators.  
Differentiating in this way enables us to consider the tension between these two agendas  
– that of the market participants repairing the pragmatic legitimacy of the market and that 
of the politicians and regulators attempting to find a new balance between the interests of 
market participants and the wider societal constituencies affected by the crisis. How do 
the two agendas mesh, how do these agendas themselves develop over the course of a 
crisis and its aftermath and to whose benefit?  
A pragmatic legitimacy crisis turns our attention to social practices of market 
participants, what they were, what has been lost, what actors are doing to repair them.  In 
order to pursue the issue of legitimacy at this level, therefore, we have to examine the 
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market itself and the actions of the members of the market. Here the recent work 
emanating from the social studies of markets research stream is helpful. These studies 
encourage a focus on the detail of market making, how actors, processes, technologies, 
distribution systems are assembled into distinctive technostructures in particular contexts 
and the consequences of this process of assembling (Callon, 1998; MacKenzie, 2006, 
2009; Callon et al., 2007; MacKenzie et al., 2007). It is at this level, where particular 
markets are being assembled, enacted and performed, that the dynamics of market 
creation and re-creation can be seen. At this level, actors do not just give up when 
conditions become tough and delegitimation threatens; on the contrary, they start again 
with the materials at hand and see whether they can reassemble them in new ways - what 
Campbell refers to as ‘institutional bricolage’ (Campbell, 2004, pp. 69-74). If we see 
markets as systems of routines, assemblages of actors, technologies and networks, then it 
is important to specify exactly how ruptures have occurred, how the market has broken 
down, how they are being repaired and, who is influencing this process. In this context, 
the tension between market participants seeking to restore pragmatic legitimacy amongst 
themselves by getting the markets going again and politicians and regulators from various 
jurisdictions concerned to embed new mechanisms to control risk and prevent further 
crises is likely to emerge.  
Financial markets, derivatives and the politics of regulation 
In the period from the 1970s, the emergence of financial markets was driven from a 
variety of sources. The rise of financial markets involved a cognitive revolution in terms 
of the development of financial economics as an academic discipline associated with the 
development of theories of capital market efficiency and risk management (MacKenzie, 
2006, 2009; MacKenzie et al., 2007). Such theories became embedded in actual market 
practices and technologies as described by Mackenzie, performing the markets and 
making new ones. The cognitive bases of these changes went along with a normative 
commitment amongst politicians, regulators, economists, market practitioners and others 
to the idea that free markets were essential to economic growth (Blyth, 2002; Prasad, 
2006; Fourcade, 2009). Regulatory institutions were recast in order to provide market 
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participants with more of a role and to act in a permissive rather than a restrictive way 
(Vogel, 1996; Levy, 2006; Panitch and Konings, 2009). In the US and the UK, in 
particular, corporations became increasingly bundles of financial assets to be traded and 
evaluated according to their capacity to deliver shareholder value (Froud et al., 2006; 
Erturk et al., 2008; Langley, 2008; Davis, 2009). Financial booms and busts 
characterized this process both within the advanced economies and the developing and 
emergent economies (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005; Minsky, 2008). Nevertheless, after 
each cycle, the financial system seemed capable of rebuilding itself, getting on with 
business, identifying new opportunities and meeting new regulatory challenges with 
ingenuity and renewed bouts of innovation. 
One of the key areas of innovation central to the expansion of the financial system was 
the development of derivative products. Mackenzie defines a derivative as ‘a contract or a 
security, such as a forward, future, option or swap, whose value depends on the price of 
another “underlying” asset, or on the level of an index or interest rate’ (2006, p. 298). 
Derivatives are ways of managing risk as they enable buyers to exchange uncertainties 
(about interest rates, currency fluctuations, equity prices, commodity prices) for 
certainties. In principle, risks are diversified across the system, migrating to those 
institutions which have the expertise to calculate them and the capital to hold them and 
away from those organizations which wish to concentrate on other things than potential 
financial instabilities.  
Derivative contracts, as described by Mackenzie (2006) and Mackenzie and Millo (2003), 
were first developed in the 1970s on regulated exchanges such as the Chicago Board 
Options Exchange and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. Regulated exchanges are 
embedded within national systems of regulation and are characterized by firstly open and 
transparent pricing in specified products, secondly by membership criteria that require 
certain levels of capital, thirdly by rules on the provision of collateral in trades and finally 
by the exchange taking on the role of the counterparty to each trade. Because the 
exchange is counterparty to each trade and collecting collateral as and when necessary, in 
the event that a buyer or seller cannot at some point meet the terms of the trade, the loss 
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is taken by the exchange rather than being transmitted automatically to another company. 
In this way, an exchange limits the degree of contagion which can occur if any particular 
buyer or seller goes bankrupt.  
However, not all derivatives have been traded on exchanges. Indeed the larger proportion 
in value of derivative contracts have been traded over-the-counter (OTC). Measured by 
amounts outstanding in US dollars, the OTC derivatives market in December 2007 was 
worth approximately $595 trillion dollars (Bank for International Settlements, 2009b) 
compared to around $79 trillion dollars outstanding on organized exchanges (Bank for 
International Settlements, 2009a). OTC contracts, as invented in the 1980s, were 
bilateral, between two parties who determined the nature of the product traded and the 
price for the product. OTC contracts raised new risks in comparison to trades on 
regulated markets. From the point of view of regulators, the most serious concern was 
that if one of the parties to the contract could not fulfill its obligations, then losses could 
be transmitted across all its counterparties. If that party had multiple large contracts with 
multiple counterparties, and caused some of these counterparties to fail, this then would 
affect these counterparties in their ability to fulfill other trades, potentially leading to a 
system wide crisis that crosses national boundaries and rapidly spreads beyond the 
control of any one national regulator. Further, because these trades were bilateral and 
only reported at the aggregate level, there was little information on how risks might be 
becoming concentrated in particular institutions or how market movements were 
affecting the level of risk being held in particular contracts. The sudden collapses at 
Barings (Leeson and Whitley, 1996), LTCM (MacKenzie, 2003) and Enron (McLean and 
Elkind, 2003) were all substantially related to trading in OTC derivatives markets, a point 
recognized particularly within the US Commodity and Futures Trading Commission 
during the late 1990s which under its Chair, Brooksley Born became an advocate of 
closer control and regulation of the OTC markets (Born 2001).  
In the US, the OTC derivatives market had developed during the 1980s and 1990s in a 
state of legal uncertainty about the enforceability of the contracts through the courts. 
Stout argues that this was because ‘American common law has long refused to enforce 
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off-exchange contracts of sale not intended to be settled by delivery of the good or 
service in question.’ (Stout, 1999, p. 768). In the US, such contracts were therefore seen 
as a form of gambling.  By contrast, she argues that the Financial Services Act of 1986 in 
the UK eliminated ‘the old rule against difference contracts….making all financial 
derivatives, whether used for speculation, legally enforceable’ (Stout, 2009, p. 3). This 
left US derivative traders at a potential competitive disadvantage compared to those 
based in the UK and in the period up to 1998 debate grew in the US about how to resolve 
this situation. OTC traders in the US were keen to regularize the situation and make OTC 
derivatives legally enforceable rather than occupying a shadowland of uncertainty. 
Although this uncertainty did not stop the market growing, it occasionally revealed itself 
when organizations outside the financial sector (most notably Gibson Greetings, Proctor 
& Gamble and Orange County) lost large amounts of money on speculative OTC 
derivatives trading and then went to the US courts filing law suits challenging the 
enforceability of these agreements (Stout, 1999, p. 779).  
By 1998, it was clear that there was going to be some sort of clearing up of the legal 
position on OTC markets with Born and the CFTC proposing an end to OTC and OTC 
traders themselves supporting the legal enforceability of the contracts. According to an 
article in the New York Times (Goodman, 2008), Born’s efforts in 1997-98 to institute 
regulation over OTC derivatives were fiercely opposed by key figures such as Alan 
Greenspan at the Fed, Robert Rubin and Larry Summers in the Clinton Treasury 
department and Arthur Levitt at the SEC who in turn were strongly supported in their 
opposition by the industry. Born’s original proposal to include the banning of OTC 
markets in a new law was rejected and she left the CFTC in 1999. A report from the 
President’s Working Group on Financial Markets (consisting of Summers, Greenspan, 
Levitt and Rainer) was published in November 1999 (President’s Working Group on 
Markets, 1999). This report argued in favour of clearing up the legal position of OTC 
derivatives in the US system and further, of legally taking them out of the purview of any 
of the US regulators, particularly the CFTC; both of these recommendations were 
followed in the Commodity Futures Modernization Act (CFMA) 2000. Stout states that 
‘the CFMA not only declared financial derivatives exempt from CFTC or SEC oversight, 
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it also declared all financial derivatives legally enforceable. The CFMA thus eliminated 
in one fell swoop, a legal constraint on derivatives speculation that dated back not just 
decades, but centuries. It was this change in the law – not some flash of genius on Wall 
Street - that  created today’s $600 trillion financial derivatives market’ (Stout, 2009, p. 3). 
Glass also describes this Act as a ‘famous victory’ for swap dealers who ‘have 
historically opposed increased regulation of OTC derivatives’ (Glass, 2009, p. S85). Tett 
states that CFMA specifically ‘stressed that “swaps” were not futures or securities and 
thus could not be controlled by the CFTC or SEC or any other single regulators. 
“Congress nailed the door shut in 2000 [on unified regulation], with the passage of the 
Commodities Futures Modernization Act” observed ISDA lobbyist Mark Brickell. The 
derivatives sector was jubilant’ (Tett, 2009, p. 87).   
These decisions meant that the OTC derivatives traders were free to develop the market 
without constraints from national regulators and indeed could rely on the courts in the 
two main jurisdictions (the USA and the UK) where such contracts were sold to enforce 
the contracts if necessary. This did not mean that issues of systemic risk disappeared 
entirely from the debate. Rather the arena of debate shifted from national regulators to 
those international institutions concerned with global financial stability. In 1998, the year 
in which it first started publishing statistics on the global OTC derivatives market, the 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) published a report in which it raised concerns 
about back office clearing facilities for these products, about the lack of clear rules 
regarding collateral and the need for clearing houses which would mitigate risk by 
standing between the two sides to a contract and thus hold the main risk, reducing the 
potential for system contagion. In 2007, a follow up report from the same body again 
emphasized the need to reduce confirmation backlogs and mitigate system risks in some 
way (Bank for International Settlements, 1998, 2007). In 2003, another body within BIS, 
the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), also raised issues concerning the impact on financial 
stability of credit risk transfer (CRT) through OTC derivatives (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision: The Joint Forum, 2005), a point still concerning the FSF when it 
began a follow-up report in 2007. This report was published in March 2008 after the 
financial crisis had begun (but before the Lehman crash) and was more assertive of the 
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need for action though still relatively circumspect (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision: The Joint Forum, 2008).  
In so far as there was order in the system, it came from the actions of the industry 
association, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA). By the early 
1990s, nearly all the participants in OTC derivatives markets were members of ISDA. 
ISDA was a form of private governance of trading relationships. It developed a standard 
contract that covered all transactions in derivatives and swaps markets. This contract was 
made responsive to changing circumstances by the continuous oversight exercised by 
ISDA’s committees where market participants brought problems as they arose and aimed 
at achieving a consensus in how to settle them. ISDA also lobbied national governments 
to make sure that its Master Contract was legal in different jurisdictions ( Flanagan, 2001; 
Morgan, 2008). It thus provided a form of transnational private rule-making which it 
ensured was consonant with and enforceable by national laws. ISDA also responded on 
behalf of the industry to the issues raised by the Basle committees as will be described in 
the next section. 
In terms of the broad relations between states, regulators and participants in the financial 
markets in the period from the passage of CFMA to the crash of 2008, the market for 
OTC derivatives was left to grow in spite of ongoing concerns of international regulatory 
bodies about their impact on systemic financial stability. Why did this happen? Firstly, 
the most acute and informed critics of the system (Born and colleagues in the CFTC) had 
been crushed by a combination of industry pressures and political and personal rivalries 
in the Clinton administration – a situation which suited the following Bush administration 
which was no less supportive of these markets. There was therefore no serious 
intellectual leadership amongst key national regulators arguing for an end to the OTC 
markets even if Basel supervisors were expressing concerns about the potential risks to 
systemic stability. Secondly, this was reinforced by a context in which a dominant free 
market discourse continued to shape economic policy-making (Djelic, 2006; Simmons et 
al., 2008; Fourcade, 2009) and made any arguments about regulating these difficult to 
sell particularly in the US and the UK. Thirdly, the OTC derivatives markets were hugely 
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profitable for the major financial institutions at this time (for reasons which are explained 
in more detail in the next section) and therefore the industry was always going to defend 
this market to the utmost degree. Fourthly, politicians were content for the financial 
markets to continue to boom since that provided jobs, taxes, and consumer credit, 
contributing to the overall feel-good factor which was essential to staying in power and 
winning elections.  
The market in action  
The rest of this paper narrows down on one particular part of the OTC derivatives 
markets - that of credit default swaps (CDS). Credit default swaps were ‘invented’ very 
recently. Tett (2009, ch. 1) describes how in 1994 JP Morgan bankers first put together 
the concept of a contract which would protect it against the default of loans which it held 
on its books. Over the following few years, they worked through some of the technical 
details of such a product, first selling it in late 1997 (see also Phillips, 2008). The first 
separate entry for CDS contracts in the BIS quarterly reports on OTC derivatives market 
occurred in 2005 and it stated that notional amounts outstanding on these contracts were 
approximately $10 trillion by mid 2005. By December 2007, the notional amount 
outstanding on OTC credit default swaps was around $58 trillion, an almost 6 fold 
increase in the space of just over two years (BIS, 2009b).  
A CDS can be described as a form of protection purchased in an OTC market by one 
party from another party on what is known as a reference entity with a reference 
obligation. The reference entity is a company which has issued bonds or taken out a loan 
and in return has promised to pay a coupon on the value of the bonds at specified times 
each year and to repay the capital sum by a certain date (the reference obligation). Credit 
events can take a variety of forms according to the specific terms of the contract 
including bankruptcy, failure to pay the coupon, debt restructuring and acceleration 
(Glass, 2009). The company to which the obligation is owed may buy a credit default 
swap in order to guarantee that even if the reference entity fails in its reference obligation 
it will receive back the capital sum on which the CDS has been taken out. In return for 
this guarantee, it pays the seller of the CDS a regular charge over the course of the 
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contract. This sum of money is known as the ‘spread’ and is calculated in terms of base 
points and the total debt. Spreads widen and narrow according to the judgement of the 
market participants concerning the likelihood of default. The more likely default is the 
higher the spread, i.e. the cost for the purchaser of the CDS.  
It was not necessary to have an ‘insurable interest’ in order to purchase a CDS contract. 
In other words, any firm could buy or sell a CDS contract on the bonds of any other firm 
whether they held the bonds of that firm or not. This reflects the fact that the CDS market 
was not simply a way of hedging risks that had been taken on as a result of a credit deal. 
It was also a way of speculating on price movements in the markets both in terms of the 
value of the underlying asset and the in terms of the changing spreads of the CDS 
contract. The total amount of CDS contracts outstanding far outweighs the total amount 
of credit bonds issued and the value at risk in the original assets. Zabel, for example, 
calculated that the ‘corporate bond, municipal bond and structured investment vehicles 
market totaled less than $25 trillion’ and therefore $20 trillion of the total $45 trillion 
notional value of CDS contracts in 2007 were speculative ‘bets’ on the possibility of a 
credit event of a specific credit asset not owned by either party to the CDS contract 
(Zabel, 2008). Stout states that ‘by the end of that year [2008], the notional value of the 
CDS market had reached $67 trillion. At the same time the total market value of all the 
underlying bonds issued by US companies outstanding was only $15 trillion’ (Stout, 
2009, p. 3). 
How did this market grow so large? On the supply side, CDS products required initial 
high levels of investment in expertise, model building, calculating systems, back office 
and IT support. Once such investments were made, however, the marginal costs of selling 
more contracts was practically zero whilst in the boom years, the gains to be achieved 
could be huge. Central to this was the successful use of leverage in that the seller was 
making a very low outlay in the first instance in return for a steady stream of payments 
over the term of the contract. This low outlay, however, had a huge potential downside 
since it could involve the seller in paying back to the buyer the whole amount of money 
which the buyer had lost if a credit event occurred in the reference entity. In the 
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circumstances of the boom years, when credit was easy, interest rates were low, 
economic conditions good, sellers concentrated on the revenues which were coming in 
from the CDS contracts being sold. In so far as they were concerned about the potential 
downside, they simply hedged their risk themselves by buying CDS contracts from 
others.  
Where did demand come from in this market? Clearly if a company was holding bonds, it 
was holding credit risk (i.e. that the bond seller would default on payments) and therefore 
it might want to hedge the risk through buying a CDS contract. However, as has been 
stated, alongside those who were genuinely hedging, there were many who were buying 
for speculative purposes, lacking any insurable interest in the underlying asset. How were 
CDS products useful as speculative investments?  Insider accounts of the market (see e.g. 
Das, 2006; Ishikawa, 2009; McDonald 2009; Tett, 2009), blogspaces and newspaper 
articles reveal some of these processes.  One strategy, for example, would relate to 
anticipating a credit event. So, for example, a hedge fund might take out a CDS contract 
on a particular reference entity that it anticipated was heading towards bankruptcy. 
During the summer of 2008, for example, as rumours of problems at Lehman Brothers 
spread, CDS contracts on Lehman increased (Burns, 2008). Much more complex 
strategies existed where the purchase of a CDS contract could be combined with an effort 
to force a company into bankruptcy by, for example, shorting its shares. In this sort of 
market trading environment, innovation, pricing and timing was crucial (Engelen et al., 
2008). Under the existing system, all the actors in the market had the incentive to 
increase the number of CDS contracts in circulation and to trade them as frequently as 
possible since bonuses and profits could only be earned by the gains on deals being 
‘booked’ and (preferably) a profit made.  
Within the market itself, the main limit to this expansion was the issue of collateral. It is 
helpful to contrast the process of collateral management in CDS markets with what 
occurs in insurance markets (since in some ways CDS contracts are an ‘insurance’ 
against default; see Stout, 1999, 2009; Glass 2009 for further analysis of this 
comparison). Insurance companies work on the basis of matching assets to calculable 
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risks. Insurance supervisors specify the reserves that are required to cover the risks taken 
by the insurance company and to link this to the premiums to be paid for cover. Insurance 
companies are therefore relatively low on leverage and high on reserves. A CDS contract, 
however, was explicitly not defined as an insurance contract and therefore not subject to 
insurance regulation. A CDS was created as a contract on a financial market which was 
constructed on the basis of finance theory and the mechanisms of these markets (Huault 
and Ranelli-Le Montagner, 2009; Stout, 2009). The guarantee that a seller of a CDS 
contract could meet the obligations of this contract was not vested in any state regulator 
but in the mechanisms of the market and in particular in the system of collateral 
depositing. Rules on collateral depositing were the province of ISDA and embedded in 
the Master Agreement and the various guidelines issued by ISDA. In principle, the seller 
would deposit with the buyer collateral (usually cash and government securities) as a 
demonstration of its ability to meet the terms of the contract. ISDA set out rules 
concerning how the level of collateral should move up or down depending on changing 
market conditions (Morgan, 2008).   
How the collateral system developed in practice over the decade before the financial 
crisis reveals a rather complex and changing picture. One particular group of companies 
who guaranteed bonds, the so- called ‘monolines’ (the biggest of which were Ambac and 
MBIA) posted no collateral at all on the contracts which they struck. Monolines had 
emerged initially as insurers of municipal bond issuers and were regulated by the New 
York Insurance Department. The rules of this regulator would have made the posting of 
collateral prohibitively expensive but rather than not enter the market, the monolines, in 
Glass’s words ‘for years fought pitched battles with the risk departments of the swap 
dealers and when the dust settled the rule was established that AAA-rated monolines did 
not post collateral on CDS’ (Glass, 2009, p. S88). The AAA rating was given to the 
monolines by the rating agencies on the grounds that they had never defaulted and their 
financial underpinnings were sound. A similar rating was given to American International 
Group Financial Products (AIG FP), the London based arm of the large US insurance 
group which sold large numbers of CDS contracts. Therefore, AIG FP was also not asked 
to post collateral. Another group of companies selling CDS consisted of hedge funds. 
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They would have to post large collateral because they were entirely unregulated and high 
risk. Collateral between investment banks was even more complex because of the huge 
multiplicity of contracts between such banks and the degree of interdependence across 
the range of products.   
ISDA, under pressure from BIS, became more active from the late 1990s in firstly 
tracking the amount of collateral being posted and secondly in encouraging members to 
post more. It began to conduct regular Margin and Collateral Surveys which were 
published on the ISDA website. These surveys indicate that there has been a gradual rise 
over the period in collateral agreements from an estimated 12000 in 2000 to around 
150000 in 2009 (ISDA, 2009, p. 2). Up until 2007, the total estimated collateral in the 
whole OTC market according to ISDA was approximately $1.3 trillion, though since then 
it has tripled, an indication of the more cautious attitude to collateral which has emerged 
after the crisis. This compares to a total notional commitment for CDS contracts alone of 
$57 trillion and a total of $516 trillion for the market as a whole according to BIS data 
(Bank for International Settlements, 2009b, p. 7). The ISDA Margin Survey in 2009 
shows that in the period from 2004 to 2007, the total reported collateral went up from 
$1.017 trillion in 2004, to $1.209 trillion in 2005 to $1.329 trillion in 2006 and to $1.335 
in 2007 (ISDA, 2009). At the same time the OTC global market had more than doubled 
from $251.823 trillion in December 2004 to $595.341 trillion in December 2007 (Bank 
for International Settlements, 2009b, p. 7). 
CDS contracts included conditions under which the levels of collateral required could 
move sharply upward or downward. Most contracts linked the level of collateral to be 
posted with the credit rating of the CDS seller since this indicated to other actors in the 
market whether the seller had the capital to meet any obligations potentially arising from 
defaults in the assets which underlay the CDS. In structured finance of the CDS sort, it 
was essential that most of the assets were triple A rated by the main rating agencies (see 
Coval et al., 2008; on rating agencies more generally, see Sinclair, 2005) since this made 
it possible for many institutional investors who were constrained in the risks which they 
could take to buy these products. If the rating was lowered, the seller would suddenly 
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become subject to a potentially heavy call for collateral (as eventually happened to AIG 
in September 2008, leaving a huge hole in AIG’s balance sheet and requiring a massive 
injection of capital from the US government, AIG, 2009). This potential for collateral 
shift would be exacerbated because institutional investors would have to sell off the 
underlying assets if the rating changed causing a further fall in their value, requiring 
further posting of collateral by the CDS sellers to meet the gap between the guaranteed 
price and the market value. The collateral system for CDS products, therefore, was 
characterized by two crucial features. One was that as conditions in the financial markets 
moved from stable to unstable, collateral requirements would kick in that would require 
companies to post more collateral just at the time when they would find it increasingly 
difficult to do so, creating further uncertainty. The other was that the whole system of 
collateral in the OTC markets was opaque, a situation that suited most of the participants 
in the market and was feasible at the transaction level as the bilateral nature of the 
contract meant that ultimately the contracting parties could reach their own agreement on 
this. At the system level, however this was more problematic since whilst a contract 
would specify the collateral in a single trade, it was impossible to tell the total collateral 
which a particular seller had already committed, the sensitivity of the collateral to 
regradings or mark to market changes, or to reference entities that might be on the verge 
of default. There was no central agency processing information on the amounts owed 
between different parties. Nor was there any central location for posting collateral. It was 
here that regulators and analysts saw the development of systemic risk building up 
(Hellwig, 2008; FSA, 2009; Haldane, 2009).  
In spite of these issues, by 2007, a massive market in CDS had developed. One reason for 
this was the expansion in potential reference entities, a process associated particularly 
with the expansion of asset backed securities. In particular the huge expansion of the 
mortgage market in the UK and the US was fuelled by the ability of financial institutions 
to repackage the original loans into Collateralized Debt Obligations (known as CDOs). 
As these were sold off, purchasers of CDOs bought CDS contracts on them to protect 
against potential default, whilst other more speculative investors bought CDS contracts 
on these reference entities without actually holding the CDOs. 
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 The CDO and CDS markets therefore expanded together. In a massive game of pass the 
parcel, risks were being transferred, cut up and repackaged in new ways, and traded 
across many different entities.  Often, the players in this market place lined up on both 
sides of the contracts. They were sellers and buyers. Many different parts of the bank 
would pick up on the action involved and would be set targets to achieve in terms of bond 
issuance, CDS sales, underwriting fees, market making fees, trading gains (Das, 2006; 
FSA, 2009; Tett, 2009). Individuals within these parts would also be incentivized to sell 
their products and make gains if they wanted to earn the massive bonuses which were 
available. Hedge funds, as more specialized actors in the market, would lubricate this 
process, searching out arbitrage opportunities amongst these products, identifying trading 
opportunities, and at the same time using the investment banks as primary brokers, 
borrowing through them for their short selling activities (Irturk and Leaver, 2008). In 
developing CDOs and CDSs in this way, actors were responding pragmatically to 
opportunities which were opening up for them. In the process, however, they were 
creating new interdependencies and systemic risks which were not fully revealed until the 
financial crisis emerged (Hellwig, 2008; FSA, 2009; Haldane, 2009). 
Once the value of the sub-prime mortgage based assets in CDOs began to decline, this 
triggered a range of changes in the CDS contracts built on and around them. In particular, 
collateral demands which had been relatively low suddenly rose massively as underlying 
CDOs began to look more vulnerable to default. Sellers of CDS contracts found 
themselves unexpectedly having to put up large sums of collateral which they did not 
have available. It looked as though CDS sellers were going to have to meet huge calls for 
recompense from the buyers of these products as defaults grew in the underlying asset 
base. The scale of these calls was impossible to predict. The value of the contracts went 
way beyond the value of the underlying assets even at their peak because of speculative 
trading. Furthermore, as CDOs had become more complex, synthetic and hybrid, their 
actual value became difficult to predict. This in turn made calculations about how much 
the seller of the CDS contract had to put in to collateral and reserve from their capital 
base increasingly difficult. The result was a seizing up of the credit markets in which the 
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financial institutions which had the highest dependency on short term lending such as 
Northern Rock, Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers became the most vulnerable (Tett, 2009). 
Reforming and rebuilding the market 
In this section of the paper, I examine how private actors and public actors responded to 
the crisis. I consider this in three parts. The first part examines the immediate response of 
the political actors in September and October 2008. The second part considers the actions 
of the private actors in the market over the period from September 2008 to September 
2009. The third part examines responses of politicians and regulators in the period from 
the end of October 2008 to September 2009. 
In September and October 2009, the global financial system came close to collapse. 
When Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy for lack of funds to cover its debts, the 
possibility arose that the same thing could happen to many other large financial 
institutions. The interdependencies in the system would rapidly cause systemic contagion 
and collapse. In order to avoid this, national governments in cooperation with their 
central banks began to devise ways to place a floor under the level of losses for financial 
institutions. After some initial uncertainty, the model for rescue became the provision of 
taxpayers’ money in order to strengthen the financial base of the institutions and 
therefore provide reassurance that any potential liabilities could be met. In the US, the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) was put in place in early October 2009 and 
earmarked $700 billion to be provided to banks to improve their capital. In the UK, the 
government committed £500bn to the financial system. In France, a fund was set up to 
refinance credit institutions with the power to lend up to 320 billion Euros (Banque de 
France, 2008). 
Three features of this process are relevant to the current discussion. Firstly, whilst the 
institutional mechanisms differed across countries, the amounts involved were huge and 
it soon became clear that the massive expenditure required particularly in the UK and the 
US would be likely to lead to major changes in the pattern of government spending and 
taxation that would shape the political agenda for many years to come. Secondly, these 
initial emergency measures were predominantly national. They involved the commitment 
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of governments to use taxpayers’ funds to save nationally based financial institutions. 
Thirdly, in return for this funding, governments now exercised a direct and indirect 
power over some key financial institutions and the financial markets more generally. This 
was partly through the positions which they now held in some banks as majority owners. 
It also reflected public expectations that the amounts involved and the impact of the crisis 
on employment and credit meant that the hands-off style of regulation that had previously 
prevailed should be reversed. Moving from these emergency measures to a response 
which tackled the underlying problems, however, took longer.    
At the same time, however, private actors also rapidly involved themselves in seeking to 
re-establish the market once it became clear that key governments had pumped sufficient 
capital into the system to keep the central financial institutions afloat. This can be seen 
very clearly in the case of the collapse of Lehman Brothers. The ISDA Master Agreement 
ensured that CDS contracts could be dealt with in advance of any other calculations 
regarding creditors and debtors in a liquidation procedure (Bliss and Kaufman, 2005; 
Glass, 2009). The provisions of the Master Agreement have been carefully constructed so 
that they are enforceable in the legal systems of most countries, a process which ISDA 
itself has promoted by taking legal opinions and lobbying governments for changes in 
legislation where necessary (Morgan, 2008). CDS contract holders do not have to wait 
through the potentially prolonged bankruptcy procedure in order to have their accounts 
settled. They expect to deal with the consequences of a ‘credit event’ very rapidly. This is 
demonstrated in the Lehman case where bankruptcy was declared on Sunday, 14 
September, 2008 and by 21 October of the same year, all CDS contracts referencing 
Lehman (in notional total $400bn) had been settled, following a procedure organized by 
ISDA.  
This was done through two mechanisms – netting and auctioning. Netting describes the 
mechanisms whereby counterparties net out their obligations to each other over the range 
of contracts which they have. This is a complex procedure but one which has emerged 
over recent years in these markets as an intermediary function with a number of third 
party firms such as DTCC (the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation) and 
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TriOptima providing these services. Netting refers to the process whereby two parties 
aggregate all the OTC contracts with each other that they hold – whether they are on the 
buy side or the sell side. In this way they identify which party is the net debtor and for 
how much and they cancel out all the other contracts leaving just this net figure as a set of 
contracts still in force. The result of this netting in the period from the Lehman 
bankruptcy to the ISDA sponsored auction was to reduce the total amount of active CDS 
contracts in the Lehman case substantially (as well as reducing the notional amounts 
more broadly across the industry by over $25 trillion: see ISDA, 2008a). 
ISDA then arranged an auction in order to determine how much sellers of protection on 
Lehman referenced contracts owed buyers of protection. The Lehman’s Chapter 11 
Petition filing (a preliminary statement of assets and liabilities required under US 
bankruptcy law1) showed that Lehman had more than $130 bn outstanding in bonds. CDS 
contracts on this debt had increased substantially in number through the summer as fears 
for Lehmans creditworthiness grew. It was crucial that the sellers of CDS contracts on 
Lehman know the extent of their liability to the buyers who were now in theory eligible 
to receive the full total of the notional value of the bonds on which they had purchased 
CDS contracts. The auction of $130 billion Lehman bonds on 21 October gave a value 
for every $1 of bond of 8.5 cents, meaning that the sellers of CDS contracts on those 
bonds owed buyers 91.5 cents in the dollar. However, the value of Lehman’s bonds had 
already been falling over the summer and credit default swap margins rising (Burns, 
2008). At the start of September 2008, the value of Lehman bonds was already down to 
80 cents in the dollar and in the immediate period of the bankruptcy they were trading as 
low as 32 cents though hopes were expressed that the final value might be 60 cents on the 
dollar (Kuo, 2008). At the final mark to market before the auction, they were at only 13 
cents in the dollar (New York Times Deal Book, 2009). These falls, therefore, had 
already precipitated massive moves of collateral from the sellers to the buyers of 
protection. Therefore the final fall to 8.5 cents was relatively small. ISDA announced that 
the auction had resulted in a transfer of only $6bn in an attempt to allay public fears 
about the CDS markets (ISDA, 2008b) but this did not take account of the previous shifts 
in collateral.  
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Nevertheless, ISDA was quick to claim success for this settlement process. Robert Pickel, 
CEO of ISDA, declared that ‘the CDS market continues to operate efficiently and the 
ISDA framework on which the CDS market arranges settlement of trades is providing 
legal and operational certainty for the industry in a time of economic uncertainty’ (ISDA, 
2008b).  ISDA’s auction had wound down over $400bn of CDS contracts in notional 
value in just over a month.  Over the period since the Lehman auction through to the end 
of September 2009 there have been 14 other credit events in which ISDA has coordinated 
the rundown of CDS contracts by similar means. ISDA has also organized the netting 
down of many existing CDS contracts in order to reduce the notional sums at risk (see for 
example the details provided in the ISDA response to the Turner Review: ISDA, 2009a)  
ISDA has also adapted its Master Agreement announcing in April 2009 its Big Bang 
protocol designed to make it easier for investors to know what will happen to credit 
derivative contracts when a credit event occurs. This Big Bang protocol has a number of 
elements to it. One element is described as ‘hardwiring’ the auction process into the 
ISDA Master Agreement process. In other words this builds in to the Master Agreement 
used by all ISDA members the compulsory requirement that parties to certain types of 
CDS contracts should engage in the auction process if a credit event occurs on the basis 
of a specified timetable, aimed at ensuring that from credit event to final settlement 
extends to no more than 120 days.  
Clearly these private initiatives could not have taken place if states had not been willing 
to back some of the regulated financial institutions with the capital necessary to meet the 
collateral demands and absorb the losses on asset values. Nevertheless, private actors 
have congratulated themselves on the speed and success with which this was achieved. 
For example, Jones, writing in a report for the City of London on OTC derivatives states 
that the Lehman default was handled so well and so seamlessly by the CDS support 
mechanisms that it is slightly puzzling to see why they should now be so many questions 
about the future of this product’ (Jones 2009, p. 8; for similar arguments see the speeches 
of the ISDA Chief Executive, Robert Pickel, e.g. Pickel 2008). 
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Far from collapsing in line with the collapse of subprime based CDOs, CDS business is 
in fact surviving well with notional values outstanding at the end of 2008 of $41.868bn 
(compared to $57.894 trillion the previous year). This is primarily because the business is 
shifting from mortgage backed CDOs (where global CDO issuance has crashed from 
around $481 trillion during 2007 to around $61 trillion in 2008 and to only around $2.5 
trillion in the first two quarters of 2009 according to the Securities Industry and Financial 
Markets Association (SIFMA, 2009) to new areas such as sovereign and municipal debt 
and corporate loans and bond issuance which are expanding precisely because of the 
nature of the crisis. This in turn has encouraged market participants to tentatively re-enter 
the public debate by restating the argument that OTC CDS contracts specifically perform 
a positive function in financial markets (see Pickel, 2008; Jones, 2009; Smith, 2009) by 
protecting against credit risk and distributing risk in the system. From the viewpoint of 
market actors, the question is how to reform the current system so that these advantages 
can be retained and the mechanisms and processes which enabled them to grow and 
develop can be re-established. 
How have governments and regulators responded to these efforts by private actors? From 
early on, a consensus emerged across the most important governments and regulators (the 
US, the UK and the EU, working through the G20) that the key mechanism to attack the 
problems arising from OTC derivatives and CDS contracts in particular was the forcing 
of more of this business onto regulated exchanges and central clearing houses (see 
Helleiner and Pagliari, forthcoming for a detailed account). The Turner Review published 
in the UK in March 2009 by the Financial Services Authority under the name of its 
Chairman, Adair Turner, argued that the OTC markets had become highly complex and 
that what was needed was a mechanism whereby trades between parties could be ‘netted’ 
out so that the real exposure (and therefore the real risks being held) would be visible, 
something which a central counterparty clearing system would facilitate (FSA, 2009). 
The Obama administration through the Treasury Secretary, Geithner, has been seeking 
legislation to require clearing of all standardized derivatives through regulated central 
counterparties (CCPs) as well as requiring what are described as robust margin 
requirements. Under the proposed system there would be more recordkeeping and 
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reporting requirements including an audit trail on all OTC derivatives as well as pressure 
to move as many contracts as possible not just into CCPs but if possible into regulated 
exchanges. The EU also supports the idea of CCPs (European Commission, 2009; 
Larosière, 2009). This agreement has been the basis of intensive international cooperation 
on the issue theme through the G20 which declared that ‘we will promote the 
standardization and resilience of credit derivatives markets, in particular through the 
establishment of central clearing counterparties subject to effective regulation and 
supervision’. (G20, 2009). 
Through the course of 2009 (up to the time of writing in September 2009), market 
participants have been broadly willing to go along with the discussion of CCPs and more 
use of regulated exchanges. They are discussing greater standardisation of contracts 
which is a necessary requirement for the creation of central counterparties as well as for 
exchange trading of these products. However, there is a strong preference amongst OTC 
dealers for CCPs rather than regulated exchanges. Standardised CDS contracts can still 
be negotiated on a bilateral basis and therefore prices remain opaque in a way which is 
not the case at exchanges. The CCP proposal does nevertheless also offer advantages to 
regulators. Under the CCP proposal, contracts will be registered with the central 
counterparty (CCP). This provides a record of the trade and considerably simplifies from 
any regulators’ point of view the task of calculating the total liabilities of any one market 
participant since this can be done simply by contacting the CCP. The CCP will 
intermediate between the buyer and the seller in the sense that there will in effect be two 
contracts; one between the buyer and the CCP and the other between the seller and the 
CCP. As a result, the collapse of either side will impact on the CCP but not on the initial 
counterparty. Collateral movements will be also standardised and managed by the CCP. 
This should reduce the potential contagion effects arising from a failure – so long as the 
CCP has the capital backing sufficient to meet such crises (Glass, 2009, p. S89).  
However, this discussion conceals some key issues that remain to be settled. Firstly, how 
much of the OTC market can be standardised in this way? The FT for example 
commented that ‘one reason why the industry has been so slow to adopt infrastructure 
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changes until now is that ISDA has traditionally tended to be dominated by bankers who 
work on the trading side of the business. Dealers had every incentive to keep the market 
opaque and bespoke, which boosted margins – and profits’ (Bullock et al., 2009). The 
argument that not all OTC contracts can be standardised has therefore found a voice 
amongst certain groups in the market. Terry Smith, chief executive of Tullett Prebon, one 
of the brokers in the market, wrote in the FT that  OTC market products are ‘of necessity  
bespoke instruments and contracts, traded in large amounts between professional 
participants: and as such, they are the antithesis of an exchange-traded product. If OTC 
business is driven to these unsuitable venues, markets will become less efficient, which is 
an outcome we should seek to avoid’ (Smith, 2009). . In his analysis, Glass also argues 
that ‘the intrinsic complexity of some OTC credit derivatives is likely to prevent 
electronic confirmation and CCP clearing from taking hold for those products’ (Glass, 
2009, p. S95; see also Jones, 2009).  
There is then likely to be an issue over how ‘standardisation’ is defined and which 
products can remain off the CCPs. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that whilst 
there is agreement from governments and regulators on central counterparties, there are 
also different national interests over how this should work in practice. Each of the main 
countries involved (the UK, the US, Germany and France and the EU) are supporting the 
provision of a CCP provider in their own jurisdiction (see Jones, 2009) for reasons to do 
with both maintaining control over this problematic area but also not losing out on the 
business opportunities associated with such CCPs. Thus the US administration is 
supporting US financial institutions in their argument for the main central clearing party 
to be US based. In the UK, however, which by the time of the crash was the largest 
derivatives centre in the world (Jones, 2009, p. 6), this is being resisted and efforts to 
build up the UK as the main EU site for CCPs are occurring. However, the EU 
Commission supported particularly by France and Germany is pushing for the central 
clearing to occur within the Eurozone which would marginalize the UK. The existence of 
multiple CCPs in different regulatory contexts opens up the possibility that each will 
define in its own way what is meant by standardised CDS contracts and conversely what 
is non-standardised. They may also define for themselves what level of collateral is 
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required for each sort of contract and whether naked CDS trading should be allowed. 
Whilst it is possible that there will be sufficient inter-governmental cooperation to close 
down regulatory arbitrage, CDS markets may shift if they find any regulatory advantage 
in doing so. These differences provide a rich environment in which private actors can 
move around new national and international regulation in order to maximize their 
interests.  
An added complication is that some of the potential CCPs which exist have been set up 
by industry insiders, usually combinations of existing exchanges and large financial 
institutions. One large US firm aiming to be a CCP is the Depository Trust & Clearing 
Corporation (DTCC), the board of which consists of non-executives drawn from the 
major US banks such as JPMorgan Chase, Citibank, Bank of New York, Goldman Sachs 
as well as a representative from NYSE2. In Europe, one of the largest potential CCPs is 
LCH.Clearnet which is owned 73.3% by users, 10.9% by exchanges and 15.8% by 
Euroclear3. In April 2009, DTCC tried to buy LCH Clearnet house but this was quickly 
countered by an alternative bid backed by a consortium of 11 banks and ICAP, an 
interdealer broker. The ICAP consortium’s bid is based on the belief that market 
participants should have some control over the registry. Even where CCPs are not 
directly owned by existing exchanges, they are clearly in a competitive environment 
where their ability to serve their customers, i.e. the market participants, is a top priority.  
What remains unclear is how regulators will have an influence over the CCPs. In 
particular, will the regulators be able to establish international agreement on collaterals 
and margin calls, processes which are crucial to reducing the build up of speculative 
trading when they are competing on CCPs and the possibility of regulatory arbitrage?  
Discussion and Conclusions  
The theme of this paper has been that in the analysis of the creation and recreation of 
markets, one has to distinguish between two levels of activity which have their own 
specific logics but which interact in a variety of ways. In order for markets to work they 
require both political and pragmatic legitimacy. In September and October 2008, both the 
political and the pragmatic legitimacy of the financial markets seemed to collapse. 
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At the political level, the break in legitimacy was fully apparent. It was seen as the end of 
an era, The Financial Times ran a debate entitled the future of capitalism as if everything 
was up for grabs again after appearing so strong and secure for so many years4. 
Governments and politicians in national and international contexts such as the G20, the 
IMF, the World Bank, UNCTAD and the EU engaged in in-depth analyses and 
discussions of how to produce a regulatory framework which would avoid future crashes. 
Coordinated action on an international scale of a sort never seen before emerged from 
these processes and is beginning to take form at the time of writing (September 2009). 
There was strong support amongst the public for action to both ‘punish’ the bankers and 
to ensure that in the future, nothing similar could happen again. 
However, alongside these processes, this paper has emphasized that market participants 
had been pursuing a normalisation process, putting the CDS market back together after 
the disaster of September 2008. Key actors such as ISDA had stepped in to put in place 
mechanisms which netted out many existing contracts (thus reducing risks and opacity) 
and importantly enabled the settlement of CDS contracts in cases of defaulting 
counterparties. ISDA and market participants publicised their role in normalisation 
through their testimonies to political committees, their press releases to the financial 
press and their production of reports and working papers. In doing so, they developed 
their own analysis of what had gone wrong, making the argument that this was not a 
problem of CDS but of wider systemic failures in bank regulation. They defended the 
idea of naked CDS contracts even though many commentators (e.g. Stout, 2009) saw this 
as central to the growth of speculation in the financial markets. They were also careful to 
support the idea of central clearing houses but not for all the products which had been 
traded through OTC activities. Similarly they supported increased margin and collateral 
requirements but left vague what this meant in practice. Insiders were keen to constrain 
the debate, shift it away from the idea of a general failure of financialised capitalism to a 
debate about the mechanics of how to run it. They sought to narrow down issues from 
broad questions of the legitimacy of financial markets as a whole to narrower questions, 
how to keep the markets going in a way which enabled them to function effectively 
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according to notions derived from financial economics. In September 2009, the final 
outcome of these debates remains unclear.  
It is, however, hard to avoid the conclusion that compared to the huge initial loss of 
legitimacy that occurred when the financial crisis hit in 2008, there has been a surprising 
resilience in terms of the response of the private actors. Even in the face of unprecedented 
levels of coordination and cooperation amongst national governments and in international 
institutions, the private actors continue to develop the markets and engage in shaping 
regulatory changes.  It may be that this resilience is in part explained by the specificities 
of the financial markets, e.g. the huge wealth and power associated with the private actors 
in this market, the high levels of expertise required to understand these developments 
which tend to reside in the private actors, the deep and lasting networks amongst the 
private actors embedded in the case discussed here in the central role taken by ISDA and 
the complexity of negotiating international responses where national differences (in 
regulatory processes and styles, in the centrality of the financial markets to the overall 
economy and in the legitimacy of finance in the broader social and political context) 
continue to exist. 
By contrast, states, faced with an emergency situation, had little choice but to provide 
vast amounts of taxpayers’ money in September and October 2008 even though they had 
at this stage limited ideas of how they eventually wanted to change things. Over the last 
year, they have made fundamental efforts to coordinate their responses and establish the 
framework for key institutions and regulatory reform. Nevertheless, precisely because 
they did rescue the financial sector, they gave the private actors the space into which to 
re-establish themselves. As a result, states in national and international arenas find 
themselves faced not by a defeated and demoralised group, crushed by public odium and 
guilt at the crisis they generated, but rather a group which is rebuilding its confidence, 
developing its own institutions for repair and also importantly expanding its business 
opportunities into new areas.  
This reflects a general issue about the creation and recreation of markets which concerns 
the relationship between the logic of politicians and regulators and the logic of market 
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participants. Market participants have an interest in rapid repair when markets fail. What 
capacities do they have to achieve this repair? It is interesting to note that even though the 
financial markets under study are highly competitive, nevertheless, the capacity to 
develop collective forms of solution was nevertheless high. This related partly to the 
strong role played over a long period by ISDA in terms of providing a cooperative 
framework in which competition could exist. It also related to the sheer power and wealth 
of participants in the market even if the crisis was undermining both factors as well as to 
the expertise of those involved and the continuing commitment to financial markets as a 
potential (if not actual) public good. Political and regulatory responses, after initial 
emergency measures have been taken, tend to be slower, particularly in the context of 
transnational markets where polyarchic tendencies are apparent and negotiation and 
compromise necessary. The tension between these two logics is clearly apparent in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis.  It is necessary to combine both the logic of the market 
participants and the logic of the political actors in order to get a full sense of the 
complexity of the situation, how legitimacy is evolving and with what effect. Whilst the 
future remains open, an analysis of the past along these lines can provide crucial insights 
for researchers and policymakers into the forces grappling to shape that future. 
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